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Introduction
Advocates of linking trade agreements with labor standards ("trade/
labor linkage" or "linkage") often bypass a close examination of the under-
lying questions of whether linkage is desirable and, if it is desirable, what
goals linkage should seek to achieve. Advocates base their support on the
view that basic labor standards are required as a matter of human rights, or
to prevent countries from gaining a competitive trade advantage because of
their poor labor standards.1 Scarcely any literature, however, explicitly
addresses the specific goals to be achieved through linkage. Rather, most
of it principally involves critiques of the adequacy of the labor provisions
in trade agreements and the absence of effective enforcement processes. 2
t Associate Professor of Labor and Employment Law, School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, Cornell University.
1. See Elissa Alben, GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the Labor-
Trade Link, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1410-16 (2001) (discussing the shift from early
discussions of linkage, which focused on assuring fair wages, to current linkage advo-
cacy emphasizing human rights standards); Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legiti-
macy, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 885, 886-93 (2003); Robert Howse, The World Trade
Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131,
148-66 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Provisions in
CAFTA, 29 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 386, 417-30 (2006); Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward,
One Step Back - Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA,
Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, and Beyond, 37 U.S.F.L. REV. 689 (2003);J. F.
Hornbeck, The U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA): Challenges for Sub-
Regional Integration, CRS Report for Congress (June 1, 2004), available at http://fpc.
state.gov/documents/organization/33747.pdf; Chantell Taylor, NAFTA, GATT, and the
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Opponents of trade/labor linkage, on the other hand, do address the
underlying questions, arguing that linkage is not justified either because
the goals of expanding free trade and improving labor standards would be
more effectively dealt with by separate and independent means,3 or
because labor standards are domestic issues that should be handled by the
particular sovereign nation. 4 This difference in focus between those on
opposing sides of the trade/labor linkage debate is understandable. Propo-
nents' primary concern is improving labor conditions in countries that are
also partners in international trade agreements, while opponents' primary
concern is protecting the free movement of capital and goods in interna-
tional markets. It is in the interest of the opponents of linkage to identify
the reasons for maintaining separate channels for protecting trade and
labor rights rather than to become involved in debates about appropriate
labor standards and the institutional mechanisms for protecting them.
Unlike most proponents of trade/labor linkage, Christian Barry and
Sanjay Reddy, in their article Just Linkage: International Trade and Labor
Standards,5 discuss the underlying justifications for linking trade and labor
standards, which they define as "the level of the real wages and the quality
of working conditions. ' 6 Barry and Reddy seek to convince opponents of
linkage that their objections are not warranted. They begin with the
assumption that those on both sides of the debate share the goal of improv-
ing labor conditions to help the worst off. 7 The authors then attempt to
show that linkage would fulfill this goal and would also meet the objec-
tions raised by opponents. While this approach attempts to address the
foundational question of whether trade and labor rights should be linked,
it has two serious limitations. First, since their overwhelming concern is
convincing opponents to accept linkage, Barry and Reddy describe an
overly narrow goal of linkage that would be acceptable to the least com-
Current Trade System: A Dangerous Double Standard for Workers' Rights, 28 DENY. J. INT'L.
L. & POL'Y 401 (2000).
3. For a thorough discussion of arguments against trade/labor linkage, see Chris-
tian Barry & Sanjay G. Reddy, Just Linkage: International Trade and Labor Standards, 39
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 545 (2006). See also Keith E. Maskus, Should Core Labor Standards Be
Imposed Through International Labor Policy?, Policy Research Working Paper #1817, at 1-
2, World Bank Development Research Group (Aug. 1997), at http://www.worldbank.
org/research/trade/wp 1817.html.
4. Barry & Reddy, supra note 3, at 564; see also JAGDISH BHAGWA-1, IN DEFENSE OF
GLOBALIZATION 240-52 (2004).
5. Barry & Reddy, supra note 3.
6. Id. at 548. Barry and Reddy describe their focus on "basic labor standards,"
which "refer to a specified level of attainment of labor standards that is deemed mini-
mally adequate." Id. They further explain that such basic standards "may be conceived
in terms of the 'core' labor standards promoted by the ILO," consisting of "freedom of
association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimina-
tion of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour;
and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation." Id.
For discussion of defining labor standards, see Maskus, supra note 3, at 4-8.
7. Barry and Reddy label this "Proposition 0," which states: "whether an institu-
tional arrangement for the governance of the global economy should be viewed as supe-
rior to another is whether it improves the level of advantage of less advantaged persons
in the world to a greater extent. Barry & Reddy, supra note 3, at 548.
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mon denominator; that is, a goal of improving in any way labor conditions
of the most disadvantaged workers.8 From there they argue that opponents
should accept linkage, because their central interest in free trade would not
be compromised by achieving this narrowly defined goal.9 A second weak-
ness in Barry and Reddy's approach is that it chiefly focuses on linkage
opponents' arguments, which results in an inadequate development of the
affirmative justifications for linkage.
This article responds to Barry and Reddy by addressing the same
question of whether trade and labor rights should be linked. Like Barry
and Reddy, I am a proponent of trade/labor linkage, but with important
differences that are relevant to the above identified limitations in their
arguments. First, my proposed justifications of linkage go beyond the goal
of merely creating any improvement, however slight, in labor standards;
they consider how linkage might promote a broader, long-term goal of
building a labor movement that can work to redistribute wealth and power
from capital to labor. Secondly, I argue that the means of fulfilling this
broader goal depend primarily on workers' collective action, and that any
linkage proposals should, therefore, be limited to those that would condi-
tion trade rights on the enforcement of workers' right of association, partic-
ularly the right to unionize. A broader redistributive goal, coupled with a
greater reliance on the right of association as the means of achieving it,
would strengthen the justification for linkage while simultaneously meet-
ing the objections raised by opponents of linkage.
Part I of this article presents an overview of the current state of global
capitalism, which is necessary for assessing the economic and social con-
text of the linkage debate. This evaluation of the realities of social and
economic forces underscores the need for policies that promote the inter-
ests of labor and have a genuine potential to confront the strength of global
corporate power. A narrow, short-term goal of limited improvements in
labor standards for individual workers underestimates both the power of
transnational corporations ("TNCs") to continue their global expansion
and search for untapped cheap labor, and the corresponding need to build
collective labor power that can achieve stable changes in labor conditions.
Part II argues that an accurate assessment of the current forces of capital-
ism supports the conclusion that global corporate power can be effectively
confronted only by global collective labor power. Given the current social
and political conditions favoring the unrestrained power of global capital-
ism, a realistic goal of promoting labor rights will also recognize that the
expansionist forces of capitalism will continue, largely unchecked, for the
foreseeable future. Understood in this context, the narrower goal of
improving labor standards, however insignificantly, is inadequate and
inherently ineffectual. Such a limited goal, based primarily on an individu-
alized vision of labor standards, is doomed to fail in the face of the power
8. Id.
9. Id. at 587. Barry and Reddy propose the transfer of subsidies from rich to poor
countries to help developing countries defray the costs of raising labor standards. Id. at
603.
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of TNCs to use their global mobility to resist and avoid improving wages or
working conditions. This conclusion should not be seen as discouraging
or defeatist, but rather as one that realistically shapes labor's long-term
strategies and tactics. The goal of redistributing wealth and power from
TNCs to labor is both broader than the simple aim of strengthening labor
standards and, ultimately, holds greater potential for securing stable and
ongoing rights for workers internationally. This broader goal justifies link-
ing trade rights to workers' right of association, which is essential to build-
ing an international labor movement that can improve labor standards and
change the power relations between employers and workers.
I. Southward Ho! The Current Economic Global Context
Capitalism, in all its stages, seeks to promote the dual goals of reaping
maximum profits and exercising maximal control over markets, labor, and
resources. ' 0 Continued expansion, both nationally and internationally, is
integral to achieving these goals." In the United States, national westward
expansion took place from the 19th century to the mid-20th century,
extending strong industrial centers from the Northeast to the Midwest. 12
In the second half of the 20th century, industrial corporations, faced with
rising wages and improved benefits for unionized workers, began
expanding southward, seeking the competitive advantage of low wages,
hostility to unions, and other financial attractions, such as tax breaks, that
the southern states offered.' 3 The depth of anti-union practices in the
south also attracted corporations from other industrialized countries, such
as Japan, to relocate to the southern United States to avoid unionization. 1 4
In earlier stages of capitalism during the 19th century and first part of
the 20th century, international expansion of capital was generally achieved
through direct colonial occupation by capitalist states to establish control
10. See MANFRED B. STEGER, GLOBALIZATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 31-36, 48-
51 (2003). While profit maximization is important to employers, retention of power and
control over the business and the workforce is equally important. As Justice Holmes
stated, "[t]he only prize much cared for by the powerful is power. The prize of the
general is not a bigger tent, but command." THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE
LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR. 146 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992). Identifying the two goals of wealth and power is
essential to creating an agenda for labor reform. Redistribution of wealth without redis-
tributing decision-making power may achieve some form of economic fairness but will
not ensure workplace democracy. See Risa L. Lieberwitz, Contingent Labor: Ideology in
Practice, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HoMo ECONOMICUS 324, 325 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
11. Id.
12. BARRY BLUESTONE AND BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA:
PLANT CLOSINGS, COMMUNITY ABANDONMENT, AND THE DISMANTLING OF BASIC INDUSTRY 25-
34 (1982).
13. See id. at 25-48; Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and
America's Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1775-82 (1993).
14. See Micheline Maynard, Toyota Said to Be Considering 4 Southern States for New
Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at C1; Steve Lohr, Nissan Uses Japan's Ways In Tennes-
see, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1983, at Dl; No Union Seen In Nissan Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
1983, at D5.
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over resources, cheap labor, and potential markets in pre-industrial coun-
tries.15 In the modern age of globalization, capitalist expansion has been
carried out by TNCs through the international trade of commodities,
exploitation of natural resources, and outsourcing of manufacturing opera-
tions. 16 The flight of TNCs from industrialized countries to the "global
south," beginning in the 1970s, is the same phenomenon that motivated
industrial corporations to move from the more heavily unionized Northeast
and Midwest of the U.S. to the non-union (and anti-union) South of the
U.S. 1 7 Similar to the role of the state governments in the southern U.S.,
national governments in the global south have adopted public policies to
attract TNCs, including financial subsidies and exemptions from labor leg-
islation in the newly created export processing zones in countries such as
China, Mexico, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 18 Governments have also
assisted TNCs' global expansion through the creation of international
financial organizations and trade agreements that ease capital mobility and
access to global markets. The World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) foster a favorable
investment climate for TNCs in the global south by conditioning loans and
preferential trade status to developing nations on their implementation of
economic "liberalization," through policies such as privatization of public
services and legal protection of intellectual property. 19
Multilateral, bilateral, or regional international trade agreements,
which eliminate tariffs on foreign imports and other trade barriers, are
part of a broader set of governmental policies and practices facilitating cor-
porate expansion into new international markets. The policy of trade/labor
linkage seeks to tie capitalist expansion to stronger labor standards by con-
ditioning the trade agreement signatories' right to free market access on
their national enforcement of labor standards.20 The logic of linkage is
15. BEVERLY J. SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS' MOVEMENTS AND GLOBALIZATION
SINCE 1870, at 137-38, 145-46 (2003); STEGER, supra note 10, at 31-32.
16. SILVER, supra note 15, at 154-55.
17. For an excellent discussion of the reasons for and impact of the "deindustrializa-
tion" of the United States, see Ansley, supra note 13, at 1758-82. See also SILVER, supra
note 15, at 48-49.
18. Maskus, supra note 3, at 4, 9-13, describing poor working conditions in export
processing zones, which exist in more than 70 countries and are defined by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development as "a well-defined geographical area,
enjoying customs privileges and other incentives, in which the primary activity is
processing of goods for export." Id. at 9-10. See also Elvia R. Arriola, Voices from the
Barbed Wires of Despair: Women in the Maquiladoras, Latina Critical Legal Theory, and
Gender at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 DE PAUL L. REV. 729 (2000); Lance Compa & Jef-
frey S. Vogt, Labor Regulation and Trade: Labor Rights in the Generalized Systems of Prefer-
ences: A 20-Year Review, 22 CoMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 199 (2001); Tina Rosenberg,
Globalization, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at sec. 6, page 28.
19. See STEGER, supra note 10, at 40-43; Guy Brucculeri, A Need to Refocus the Man-
date of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 17 W.R.L.S.I. 53, 70-73
(2004); Risa L. Lieberwitz, Confronting Privatization and Commercialization of Academic
Research: An Analysis of Social Implications at the Local, National, and Global Levels, 12
IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 109, 140-44 (2005).
20. For descriptions of labor standards included in trade agreements, see Pagnat-
taro, supra note 2, at 387-406, 417 (describing the core labor standards, including the
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appealing, as trade agreements facilitate capital mobility and enhance cor-
porate profits by eliminating tariffs on foreign goods. Rather than relying
on voluntary policies of "corporate social responsibility," 2 1 trade/labor
linkage attempts to condition expanded market access on the inclusion of
enforceable labor standards in trade agreements. Advocates support
linkage as a means of improving labor conditions in developing countries,
given workers' vulnerability to exploitation and minimal mobility.22
Improving labor standards internationally is also advocated as one means
of equalizing the playing field among countries competing for corporate
investment, by reducing governments' ability to attract investment and
manufacturing through low wages, minimal benefits, and poor health and
safety standards. 23
How do these arguments fare when viewed in the context of current
global capitalist expansion? What are the potential consequences of either
adopting or failing to adopt linkage provisions? First, if trade agreements
do not include labor standards, global capital mobility will continue its
unfettered search for cheap and pliant labor forces to achieve higher corpo-
rate profits and greater control over labor and natural resources. But, what
will happen if there is regulation of corporations through linkage of trade
rights and labor standards? The same thing-the expansion of global capi-
talism will continue essentially unimpeded, regardless of trade/labor
linkage. Even partial success in raising labor standards in developing
countries cannot possibly create wages and working conditions that rival
unionized wages in the U.S. or Europe, or even non-union wages in the
southern U.S. 2 4 And while any improvement in labor standards for work-
ers in developing countries would be a positive result, such improvements
through trade/labor linkage will still leave the TNCs in the position to pay
these workers extremely low wages with few benefits. 2 5 Furthermore,
monitoring the enforcement of any protective labor regulation will be
extremely difficult, leaving corporations, for the most part, free of mean-
right of association and collective bargaining, prohibitions on forced labor or child
labor, minimum wages, and safety and health protections, mandated by the U.S. Con-
gress in the Trade Act of 2002 and the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority for inclu-
sion in U.S. trade agreements. The author argues that the United States-Central
American Trade Agreement does not fully comply with this Congressional mandate);
Taylor, supra note 2, at 416-17 (describing the labor standards in the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, which is the labor side agreement to the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement).
21. For critiques of voluntary "corporate codes of conduct," see Bob Hepple, A Race
to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20 CoMP.
LAB. L. & POL'YJ 347, 357-60 (1999). For a defense of the utility of corporate codes of
conduct, see Kamil Ahmed, International Labor Rights - a Categorical Imperative?, 35
R.D.U.S. 145, 172-80 (2004).
22. Cf. Harry Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin
Aaron Lecture, 22 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 275-76 (2001) (discussing the fact that
"unlike capital, goods, or information, workers generally do not move across national
borders in our global economy").
23. See Pagnattaro, supra note 2, at 388-90.
24. See Barry and Reddy, supra note 3, at 632-34.
25. Id.
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ingful labor standards. This enforcement problem would exist even if trade
agreement labor provisions included more stringent enforcement mecha-
nisms than currently exist in NAFTA and other trade agreements, because
of the difficulties of creating enforcement agencies with sufficient power
and independence from international trade institutions to regulate
effectively.
II. Linking Trade with the Right of Association
A. Global Capitalism and Right of Association
Despite the inability of trade/labor linkage to slow the expansionist
forces of global capitalism, I specifically favor linking trade rights and
workers' right of association. This position is based on a realistic assess-
ment of the powerful forces of global capitalism- a position that recognizes
.that labor provisions in trade agreements will not meaningfully affect the
machinery of capitalist expansion. Regardless of the existence of interna-
tional trade agreements, or the inclusion of labor standards provisions in
such trade agreements, the logic of capitalism is expansionist. The dual
goals of capitalism-to increase profits and to control resources-require
global capital mobility to enable corporations to create new markets, gain
access to materials needed for production, and relocate manufacturing to
countries with cheaper and more vulnerable workforces. International
trade agreements facilitate global capital mobility, but they do not cause
corporations to relocate to other countries. The negative effects of U.S.
corporate relocations to developing countries include the poor labor stan-
dards in the maquiladoras in Mexico and other export processing zones. A
description of a causal link between NAFTA or other trade agreements and
these relocations, however, misses the fundamental systemic characteristics
of capitalism, which motivated corporate relocation to Mexico and other
countries, before and after NAFTA, in search of cheap labor and
resources.
26
The current global context is one of almost complete hegemony of cap-
italist economies. Combined with the bolstering institutional structures of
the World Bank, IMF, and WTO, this global economic context leaves little
hope that trade/labor linkage will have an impact on corporate power. Spe-
cific labor standards in trade agreements, such as a minimum wage, health
and safety protections, elimination of child labor, and prohibitions on sex-
ual discrimination, will not be enforced effectively and will not slow corpo-
rate relocations in search of exploitable workforces. Investing large
amounts of energy into lobbying for such broad trade/labor linkage can
lead to a justified feeling of despair, given the futility of even well-meaning
26. See Christopher L. Erickson & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Labor Standards and Trade
Agreements, 19 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 145, 161 (1998) (concluding that "much of the
American trade expansion with Mexico is due to the unilateral decision of the Mexican
government in the late 1980s to liberalize the economy and to abandon an earlier protec-
tionist policy. NAFTA was a ratification in treaty terms of this change within Mexico,
not the cause of it.").
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calls for such provisions. Instead, focused advocacy on conditioning trade
rights on workers' right of association can more effectively confront the
difficulties of creating meaningful trade/labor linkage in the global econ-
omy. A realistic assessment of global capitalism includes both an evalua-
tion of the current forces and a long-term view of the potential to resist or
overcome these forces. At some point, global capital will exhaust the sup-
ply of vulnerable workforces in developing countries, just as corporations
reached the limit of untapped exploitable U.S. workforces in the southern
states. At that global saturation point, workers' right of association-par-
ticularly through unionization on an international scale-will present the
greatest potential for pushing back against the forces of global capitalism.
Thus, linkage of trade and the right of association represents a mean-
ingful tactic to build an international labor movement over the long term.
A consistent focus on the right of association recognizes that international
collective action is necessary to resist corporate exploitation. The inclu-
sion in trade agreements of the right of association will not be more effec-
tively enforced than other labor standards, but the focus on the right of
association retains its importance as a tactic in a broader strategy of creat-
ing an international labor movement. The ultimate goal of international
unionization may be as profound as a complete shift of ownership and
control of corporations to workers. But, in any event, a preliminary goal of
international union organizing will be a redistribution of power, in the
form of sharing both the wealth and decision-making authority, from
employers to the unions representing the workforce. Most likely, this redis-
tribution will take place through collective bargaining between employers
and unions, where workers can decide, with their representative unions,
what their priorities are in raising labor standards.
It is difficult-perhaps impossible-at the current moment to know
when this saturation point of global capital will occur. In the meantime,
efforts to establish an international labor right of association will contrib-
ute to current unionization campaigns throughout the world and will help
position the labor movement for greater success in unionization when the
threat of capital flight is no longer a geographical possibility.
B. Reasons for Placing a Priority on the Right of Association
The primary reason for placing a priority on the right of association in
linkage proposals is the essential nature of unionization as the means for
labor to engage in collective action to redistribute wealth and power. There
are additional related reasons for favoring the right of association over
other labor standards in the linkage debate. These reasons also demon-
strate that linking the right of association and trade would most effectively
address the objections raised by linkage opponents. 27
First, the right of association is a fundamental right that can be
applied both universally and in a way that is sensitive to the differences in
27. See Barry and Reddy, supra note 3, at 548-49, 555-65 (providing an extensive
discussion of the opponents' arguments).
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levels of development in different countries. The right of association is
inherently situationally sensitive, as labor organizations will choose differ-
ent priorities in bargaining, depending on the social and economic condi-
tions of the particular employer and region. Universal application of the
right of association can contribute to the growth of labor unions and other
social justice organizations through which workers can make demands in
the political and economic spheres. The right of association is, therefore,
integrally linked to other labor rights, such as a livable wage, due process
in the workplace, and health and safety protections. The implementation
of the right of association, however, will result in varied substantive out-
comes in wages and other labor standards in different countries and
regions, depending on the power of the particular labor movement and
other local conditions. Thus, inclusion of the right of association in inter-
national trade agreements responds to the objection that linkage inappro-
priately imposes advanced capitalist conditions on early capitalist
developing countries.
A related objection to trade/labor linkage is a freedom of contract
argument. Similar to the position that trade/labor linkage is not situation-
ally sensitive, the freedom of contract argument views labor standard provi-
sions in trade agreements as impediments to businesses' ability to move to
locations that will provide them with the greatest competitive advantage.
Similar to the "situationally sensitive" objection, the freedom of contract
argument states that trade/labor linkage seeks artificially to impose
inflated requirements for wages and other labor standards on workplaces
in developing economies. In the form of a freedom of contract argument,
this objection critiques linkage as an attempt by powerful industrial
nations to interfere with businesses' ability to negotiate freely with their
employees for terms of employment appropriate for the particular histori-
cal and regional conditions.
Judicial and legislative developments from earlier periods of U.S. his-
tory reinforce the conclusion that prioritizing the right of association over-
comes the objections that trade/labor linkage interferes with employers'
freedom of contract. The right to trade freely is appropriately conditioned
on respecting the rights of association-in particular, the right to unionize,
as explained by Justice Holmes in 1896, writing as a justice on the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court, dissenting against a broad labor injunction issued
in Vegelahn v. Guntner.28 Holmes drew a parallel between businesses' right
to engage in free trade in a competitive market and workers' collective right
to compete freely in negotiations with their employers over wages and other
working conditions. 29 As later recognized in the 1935 enactment of the
28. 167 Mass. 92, 104-09 (1896).
29. "One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the
effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised
under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible return. Combination
on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary and
desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way." Id. at
108.
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NLRA, genuine freedom of contract does not exist when the employer has
the power to impose a contract of adhesion. 30
The right of association also forms the foundation for a genuine free-
dom of contract in international trade, where the right to unionize will
provide employees with collective power to avoid contracts of adhesion.
The right of association promotes autonomy for workers, enabling them to
select union representation and define the bargaining agenda. Employers
cannot rationally complain that collective bargaining interferes with their
freedom of contract; under no legitimate conception of freedom of contract
is it required that employers have an advantageous bargaining position over
individual employees. Through collective bargaining, the union and
employer mutually agree to contractual provisions that apply to the group
and the individual employees, including wages, benefits, health and safety,
and participation in workplace decisions. The collective can also protect
the individual from abuse of power by the employer-for example, through
collective bargaining for due process in the workplace, which requires that
employers use their power to hire, fire, and discipline in ways that comport
with due process, including protection from racial, religious, and gender
discrimination.
Similarly, the right of association does not present a problem of pro-
tectionism. Because it is both universally applicable and situationally sen-
sitive, the right to associate does not provide an opportunistic means for
creating de facto trade barriers. This can be illustrated by comparing
trade/labor linkage on the basis of a minimum wage with linkage based on
the right of association. While proponents of trade/labor linkage can artic-
ulate a demand for a minimum wage provision in international trade agree-
ments in terms of providing a fundamental labor right, such a demand may
be a pretext for a protectionist tactic designed to maintain trade barriers by
scuttling trade agreements or imposing sanctions under trade agreements.
Protectionists may seek linkage provisions that act as trade barriers due to
a signatory nation's predictable failure to fulfill the pre-determined labor
standards. The right of association, by contrast, can contribute universally
to the growth of unions, which can define their own collective demands in
ways appropriate to the country's economic and social conditions.
Through the right of association, the labor movement of a particular coun-
try can win the protection of labor standards, an achievement that respects
the autonomy and self-determination of those workers. 3 1 This is qualita-
30. Section 1, "Findings and declaration of policy," of the National Labor Relations
Act, states, in part: "Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employ-
ees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury ... by restor-
ing equality of bargaining power between employers and employees." 29 U.S.C. § 151
(2005).
31. Cf. Lowell Turner & Richard W. Hurd, Building Social Movement Unionism: The
Transformation of the American Labor Movement, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR'S
QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9, 11 (Lowell Turner et al. eds., 2001) (defin-
ing social movement unionism as "a type of unionism based on member involvement
and activism").
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tively different from protectionist labor standards set by trade agreements,
such as a minimum wage.
It is especially important for labor unions in developed countries to
avoid protectionist tactics. As proponents of trade/labor linkage, unions
should choose tactics that promote international labor solidarity, while
rejecting those that promote divisions among workers. Unions in advanced
capitalist economies must come to grips with the fact that the industrial
base of jobs has been largely eliminated from their countries. 3 2 Many of
these unions have accepted this, turning to national union campaigns in
service sector businesses that cannot relocate.3 3 Unions should bring this
same understanding to their positions on international trade agreements,
recognizing that protectionism will not prevent the relocation of jobs to
developing countries and can exacerbate divisions among workers across
national borders. Protectionist tactics, such as a minimum wage standard
in trade agreements, can encourage workers in industrialized countries to
blame workers in developing countries for "taking" their jobs at a low
wage. Unions should, instead, advocate for trade/labor linkage that
encourages workers to see their common interests on the basis of class
membership rather than citizenship. Universal enforcement of the right of
association benefits workers in all countries and can be supported for the
same reasons by workers and labor movements in all countries where the
right to unionize is poorly enforced, including the United States. Con-
versely, employers in all countries will oppose enforcement of the right to
unionize for similar reasons, as the right to unionize interferes with
employers' unilateral control over workers and profits.
The focus on workers' common class interests in supporting a univer-
sal right of association can also promote alliances among unions that rec-
ognize that the goals of the labor movement can be achieved only by
organizing on both a national and international basis. Some unions are
engaging in cross-border alliances in coordinated organizing campaigns
against TNCs, including the use of trade/labor linkage provisions as one
organizing tactic. 34 Such alliances are difficult to achieve and will not alle-
viate most of the immediate pain of corporate relocations. The process of
building relationships among unions and workers in different countries,
however, can help workers who have lost jobs fix the responsibility for
those losses on their employers rather than on workers in developing
32. See Ansley, supra note 13, at 1765-72 (discussing the shift of U.S. jobs to the
service sector and the growth of the contingent work force).
33. See Steven Greenhouse, Unions Focus Attention on Workers in Service Industries,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at C1.
34. See, e.g.,Jim Wilson, From "Solidarity" to Convergence: International Trade Union
Cooperation in the Media Sector; DavidJessup & Michael E. Gordon, Organizing in Export
Processing Zones: The Bibong Experience in the Dominican Republic; Larry Cohen & Steve
Early, Globalization and De-Unionization in Telecommunications: Three Case Studies in
Resistance, in TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION AMONG LABOR UNIONs 202-22 (Michael E.
Gordon & Lowell Turner eds., 2000).
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111. Enforcing the Right of Association
Even with acceptance of the general principle of linkage between trad-
ing rights and the right of association, trade agreement signatories will
continue to disagree about the exact parameters of the right of associa-
tion.3 6 To be meaningful, the right of association should include workers'
right to form and join unions of their own choosing, collective bargaining
for unionized workers, the right to strike, enforcement of collective bargain-
ing agreements, and the right of individuals and unions to participate in
the political process. To ensure the independence and autonomy of
unions, employers should be prohibited from supporting or dominating
labor organizations. National and local laws should provide effective sanc-
tions against employers who violate the right of association. As in all pro-
posals for linking trading rights and other labor standards, however,
linkage based on the right of association will likely be poorly enforced in
the short-term. Further, as discussed in Section I, a realistic assessment of
current social conditions and long-term goals of the labor movement recog-
nizes that linkage in trade agreements will neither result in rigorous
enforcement of labor standards nor affect the forces driving global capital-
ist expansion. The importance of linkage focused on the right of associa-
tion, including requirements of legislative recognition of the right to
unionize, bargain collectively, and strike, lies in its potential to improve the
short- and long-term position of labor unions to organize workers and to
build cross-border alliances among unions in signatory nations.
While recognizing the difficulty of effectively implementing a linkage
between trade and the right of association, proposals should strive,
neverthe-less, to create rigorous international enforcement mechanisms.
An independent international enforcement agency should be created with
adequate investigative and enforcement powers, including an enforceable
order of trade sanctions for violations of the right of association. There is a
strong argument for assigning the enforcement function to an international
institution independent of the WTO and other trade organizations, which
lack the institutional interest or expertise to enforce labor or political
rights.37 Delegating enforcement to the WTO would not be a credible solu-
tion, given the examples of the WTO bending to the interests of TNCs, as in
the case of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
35. See Ansley, supra note 13, at 1782-84, 1891-92 (describing the Ohio-based Farm
Labor Organizing Committee's cooperative project with Mexican workers).
36. See Lance Compa, Assessing Assessments: A Survey of Efforts to Measure Countries'
Compliance with Freedom of Association Standards, 24 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 283, 283-
85 (2003) (discussing the complexities of defining the scope and content of the right of
association and in measuring rates of compliance with freedom of association
standards).
37. For a countervailing argument advocating the use of the WTO to enforce core
labor standards, see Ahmed, supra note 21, at 164-70.
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Property Rights (TRIPS), 3 8 which requires developing countries to adopt
Western-style intellectual property laws.39 TRIPS was created largely due
to the power of the U.S. Trade Representative to the WTO, under the influ-
ence of large U.S. corporations. 40 There is also an argument against plac-
ing the enforcement function in a tripartite institution like the ILO,
comprised of governments, employers, and unions. The presence of
employers as equal partners will undermine effective enforcement of labor
standards, as will the presence of governments that are not strongly com-
mitted to enforcing the right to unionize. 4 1 A separate international
enforcement agency to enforce the trade/right of association linkage
should be independent from the parties and governments involved in the
disputes.
Conclusion
There is a significant difference between, on the one hand, a broad
trade/labor linkage that includes multiple kinds of labor standards and, on
the other hand, the linkage proposal advocated here, which principally
focuses on the right of association. While both seek to improve labor con-
ditions, the right of association is focused on the larger goal of shifting
power and wealth from capital to labor. The only means to achieve this
long-term goal is by building a labor movement, through workers engaging
in collective action on an international scale. And the only way accurately
to assess the difficulties of building a global labor movement is to take
seriously the realities of the current and future power of global capital. An
honest assessment of the forces of global capital supports the conclusion
that trade/labor linkage will neither diminish the expansionist forces of
capitalism nor significantly improve labor standards. Labor standards will
only improve through the demands of a labor movement that is created by
the collective action of workers-either as an exercise of legally protected
rights to unionize or in the face of violations of those rights. Thus, trade/
labor linkage should be envisioned in terms of this broader collective strug-
gle, with proposals that can make some contribution to supporting work-
ers' right to organize. While this proposal requires a long-term vision of
building a labor movement strong enough to win basic labor standards for
workers, it presents an outline for change predicated on an accurate
account of the realities of current social and economic forces.
38. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
39. See Lieberwitz, supra note 19, at 140-41.
40. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L. L.
481, 485-89 (2002).
41. For critiques of the ILO as being a weak and ineffectual institution due to its
tripartite structure and its lack of enforcement powers, see Sean Cooney, Testing Times
for the ILO: Institutional Reform for the New International Economy, 20 Comp. LAB. L. &
POL'YJ. 365 (1999).

